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AMENDED DLD-233      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2046 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  LINDSWORTH SESSAY, 
     Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 2:12-cv-02667) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
May 9, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  July 26, 2013) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Lindsworth Sessay (also known as Lindsworth Brown-Sessay), an immigration detainee 
proceeding pro se, petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey to rule on his pending habeas petition and an Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”) to “set a bond.”  He also requests other, miscellaneous relief.  For the reasons that 
2 
 
follow, we deny those requests for miscellaneous relief, and we will deny the mandamus 
petition.  
I. 
 Sessay is a native and citizen of Jamaica.  In January 2011, the Department of 
Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, charging him with being 
removable for, inter alia, having been convicted of an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Sessay was taken into immigration custody at that time.  Although a final 
order of removal was issued against him in August 2012, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
reopened his removal proceedings in January 2013.  Those reopened proceedings are ongoing, 
and Sessay remains in custody. 
 In May 2012, Sessay filed a pro se habeas petition in the District Court pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the legality of his ongoing immigration detention.  In June 2012, he 
moved for summary judgment on that petition.  Later that month, the District Court directed 
the Government to answer the petition within 45 days and Sessay to reply within 30 days of his 
receipt of that answer.  In July 2012, the Government filed its answer; Sessay never filed a 
reply.  In January 2013, the District Court denied Sessay’s motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that “there are material issues of fact in dispute which require this Court’s full 
examination of the record of this case.”  (Dist. Ct. Op. entered Jan. 3, 2013, at 4.)  No further 
action has been taken on his habeas petition. 
 Sessay now seeks an order from this Court directing the District Court to rule on his 
habeas petition.  He also seeks to compel the IJ who is presiding over his removal proceedings 
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to “set a bond.”1  Lastly, he requests other, miscellaneous relief, including an order granting his 
habeas petition and a declaration that his continued detention is unlawful. 
II. 
 A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary circumstances.  
See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  A petitioner 
seeking the writ “must have no other adequate means to obtain the desired relief, and must 
show that the right to issuance is clear and indisputable.”  Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 
(3d Cir. 1996).  Generally, a court’s management of its docket is discretionary, see In re Fine 
Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982), and there is no “clear and 
indisputable” right to have a district court handle a case in a particular manner.  See Allied 
Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (per curiam).  That said, a writ of 
mandamus may issue where a district court’s “undue delay is tantamount to a failure to 
exercise jurisdiction.”  Madden, 102 F.3d at 79.   
 We recognize that, in this case, a number of months have passed since the expiration of 
Sessay’s time to reply to the Government’s answer to his habeas petition.  Since that time, 
however, the District Court has ruled on his summary judgment motion and indicated that 
material disputes of fact must be resolved to adjudicate his habeas petition.  Although the 
complained-of delay is of concern, it does not rise to the level of a failure to exercise 
jurisdiction.  Cf. id. (concluding that approximately eight-month delay in habeas action did not 
warrant mandamus relief).  We are fully confident that the District Court, mindful that Sessay 
                                              
1
 It is not entirely clear whether Sessay’s use of the phrase “set a bond” is intended to mean 
“schedule a bond hearing” or “release him on bond.”  Either way, as explained in Section II, he 
is not entitled to mandamus relief. 
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is challenging the legality of his ongoing immigration detention, will promptly rule on his 
habeas petition.   
 Sessay also seeks mandamus relief to compel the IJ to “set a bond.”  But the 
appropriateness of bond or a bond hearing in Sessay’s immigration proceedings goes to the 
merits of his habeas petition and, thus, may be addressed when the District Court rules on that 
petition.  Accordingly, a writ of mandamus is not warranted here.  See id.  Nor is Sessay 
entitled to an order from this Court granting his habeas petition or a declaration that his 
detention is unlawful.  Again, those issues go to the heart of his habeas proceedings and will be 
ruled upon in due course by the District Court. 
 In light of the above, we will deny Sessay’s petition for a writ of mandamus.  Sessay’s 
other requests for relief are denied.  We note that our denial of mandamus relief is without 
prejudice to the filing of a new mandamus petition if the District Court has not acted on 
Sessay’s habeas petition within 60 days of the date of this opinion.  See id. 
